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Abstract
This paper studies the link between volatility, labor market ￿ exibility, and international
trade. International di⁄erences in labor market regulations a⁄ect how ￿rms can adjust to
idiosyncratic shocks. These institutional di⁄erences interact with sector speci￿c di⁄erences in
volatility (the variance of the ￿rm-speci￿c shocks in a sector) to generate a new source of com-
parative advantage. Other things equal, countries with more ￿ exible labor markets specialize in
sectors with higher volatility. Empirical evidence for a large sample of countries strongly sup-
ports this theory: the exports of countries with more ￿ exible labor markets are biased towards
high-volatility sectors. We show how di⁄erences in labor market institutions can be parsimo-
niously integrated into the workhorse model of Ricardian comparative advantage of Dornbusch,
Fischer, and Samuelson (1977). We also show how our model can be extended to multiple factors
of production.
￿We are grateful to Pol Antr￿s, Gordon Hanson, Peter Neary, Barbara Petrongolo, Steve Redding, Tony Venables,
and Jaume Ventura for helpful discussions and suggestions. Kalina Manova, Martin Stewart, and Rob Varady provided
superb research assistance. We thank Davin Chor for graciously sharing his data on external ￿nance dependence. All
errors remain ours. Cuæat gratefully acknowledges ￿nancial support from Spain￿ s CICYT (SEC 2002-0026 and ECO
2008-04669).1 Introduction
Comparative advantage is usually attributed to international di⁄erences in production capabilities
stricto senso. Such di⁄erences stem from international di⁄erences in either technology (as in the
Ricardian model) or relative factor endowments (as in the Hecksher-Ohlin model). But institutional
di⁄erences can give way to comparative advantage, too, even when technologies and relative factor
endowments are identical across countries. In particular, this paper studies the role of labor market
￿ exibility as a source of comparative advantage.
Cross-country di⁄erences in labor market ￿ exibility ￿as with other measures of institutional
di⁄erences ￿are correlated with country income levels. Nevertheless, substantial di⁄erences in labor
market ￿ exibility persist within groups of countries with similar income levels. Within the OECD,
for example, North-America, the British Isles and Oceania have much more ￿ exible labor markets
than most of continental Europe. Table 1 illustrates these di⁄erences within income groups using an
index of labor market ￿ exibility constructed by the World Bank.1 These institutional di⁄erences are
associated with important cross-country di⁄erences in the ￿ ows of workers between employment and
unemployment and, more importantly for our purposes, across jobs. Table 2, taken from Blanchard
and Portugal (2001), compares job ￿ ows in the US (a country with a ￿ exible labor market) and
Portugal (a country with a substantially more rigid labor market).2 Although the American and
Portuguese unemployment rates were similar during the early 90s, the Portuguese labor market
exhibited much smaller ￿ ows of workers across di⁄erent jobs. This ￿nding is echoed in the OECD
Employment Outlook (1999, Chart 2.3) covering the 1990s, which shows a signi￿cant negative
correlation across OECD countries between employment protection and job turnover rates.3
Worker ￿ ows vary importantly also across industries. Table 3, taken from Davis et al. (1997),
summarizes the distribution of average annual excess job reallocation rates (as a percentage of
employment) across four-digit (US SIC) manufacturing industries in the US. Excess job realloca-
1We discuss this index in detail in Section 4.
2Job creation at time t equals employment gains summed over all plants that expand or start up between t￿1 and
t. Job destruction at time t equals employment losses summed over all plants that contract or shut down between
t ￿ 1 and t. Net employment growth equals the job creation rate minus the job destruction rate. Job reallocation
at time t is the sum of job creation and job destruction. Excess job reallocation equals the di⁄erence between job
reallocation and the absolute value of net employment change.
3Bertola and Rogerson (1997) argue that additional institutional di⁄erences across countries ￿ such as those
generating wage compression ￿may counteract the e⁄ects of di⁄erences in employment protection and generate much
smaller di⁄erences in the observed job reallocation rates across countries. In a di⁄erent context (across regions in a
country), Aghion et al. (2008) also highlight the important e⁄ects of di⁄erences in labor market institutions within
India. They ￿nd that the growth e⁄ects of product market liberalization depend on di⁄erences in labor market
regulation across states.
1tion re￿ ects simultaneous job creation and destruction within industries. It represents the ￿excess￿
portion of job reallocation ￿over and above the amount required to accommodate net industry em-
ployment changes. Table 3 shows that the within-industry reallocation process exhibits a remark-
able degree of cross-industry variation. Clearly, this variation cannot be attributed to di⁄erences in
labor market regulation. We interpret this cross-industry variation as re￿ ecting di⁄erences in the
needed adjustments, at the ￿rm-level, to idiosyncratic demand and productivity shocks: a higher
within-industry dispersion of shocks entails a larger response in the within-industry reallocation of
employment between ￿rms.
We formalize a theory of comparative advantage in this context. For simplicity, we frame our
insights within a one-factor model of trade between two countries with di⁄erent labor market insti-
tutions (a ￿￿ exible￿and ￿rigid￿economy). These di⁄erences interact with industry-level di⁄erences
in the dispersion of ￿rm-level shocks to generate industry-level di⁄erences in relative productivity,
and hence a ￿ Ricardian￿source of comparative advantage. Again for simplicity, we do not model
any technological di⁄erences between countries. Thus, in the absence of shocks, di⁄erences in labor
market ￿ exibility are irrelevant. There is then no source of comparative advantage, and no motive
for trade. However, in the presence of ￿rm-level shocks, the country with ￿ exible labor markets can
reallocate labor across ￿rms more easily ￿leading to higher industry average productivity levels
relative to the country with rigid labor markets. This productivity di⁄erence is then magni￿ed by
the dispersion of the within-industry shocks, which we refer to as industry volatility. The latter
thus interacts with the institutional labor market di⁄erences to induce a pattern of comparative
advantage across industries.
We also extend our model to incorporate a second factor, capital, whose reallocation across ￿rms
is not a⁄ected by the labor market institutions. Provided that this reallocation of capital across
￿rms is subject to the same degree of rigidity in both countries, then the pattern of comparative
advantage driven by industry volatility becomes more muted for capital intensive industries. In
other words, rigid economies face less of a comparative disadvantage in capital intensive industries
￿holding industry volatility constant. This extended model also explains how capital intensity
a⁄ects comparative advantage based on di⁄erences in labor market institutions ￿separately from
the standard Hecksher-Ohlin e⁄ect via interactions with a country￿ s capital abundance.
We then empirically test the predictions of our model on the observed pattern of comparative
advantage for a large sample of countries, using country-level export data at a detailed level of
2sector disaggregation (hundreds of sectors).4 We thus test whether countries with relatively more
￿ exible labor markets concentrate their exports relatively more intensively in sectors with higher
volatility. We also test the additional prediction of our model that capital intensity reduces this
e⁄ect of volatility for countries with relatively more rigid labor markets. Naturally, we also control
for other determinants of comparative advantage such as the interactions between country-level
factor abundance and sector-level factor intensities. We use two distinct estimation approaches
towards these goals. The ￿rst approach, in the spirit of Romalis (2004), uses the full cross-section
of exports ￿ ows across countries and sectors to test for interactions e⁄ects between the country-level
and sector-level characteristics that jointly determine comparative advantage.5 Recognizing some
important limitations (both theoretical and empirical) associated with this method, we also use a
second more robust approach based on a country-level analysis. Both approaches strongly con￿rm
our theoretical results.
The potential links between labor markets and comparative advantage have received an increas-
ing level of attention in the recent trade literature. Saint-Paul (1997) analyzes the links between
￿ring costs and international specialization according to the life-cycle of goods: countries with ￿ ex-
ible labor markets exhibit a comparative advantage in ￿new￿industries subject to higher aggregate
demand volatility (relative to more ￿mature￿industries). Haaland and Wooton (2007) also focus on
di⁄erences in ￿ring costs across countries, and examine their implications for the location of multi-
national a¢ liates. Davidson et al. (1999) present an equilibrium unemployment model in which the
country with a more e¢ cient search technology has a comparative advantage in the good produced
in high-unemployment/high-vacancy sectors. This is due to the di⁄erences in prices required to
induce factors to search for matches in sectors with di⁄erent break-up rates. Gald￿n (2002) shows
that labor market rigidities can also a⁄ect specialization through long-term unemployment, which
reduces the skills workers may need in ￿new-economy￿sectors. In the current paper, we focus on a
relatively more tractable theoretical framework that generates a richer set of predictions and lends
itself to direct empirical testing. In particular, we highlight the role of ￿rm-level volatility and
labor market ￿ exibility in shaping the pattern of comparative advantage.6 We show how measur-
able di⁄erences in ￿rm-level volatility across sectors interact with capital intensity di⁄erences to
generate a pattern of comparative advantage across countries with di⁄erence levels of labor market
4Production data from UNIDO is not available at this level of disaggregation.
5There is also a substantial earlier literature, starting with the work of Baldwin (1971, 1979), that examined the
relationship between the structure of commodity exports and patterns of factor abundance.
6Koren and Tenreyro (2005) and di Giovanni and Levchenko (2008) also study the relationship between industry
volatility and specialization, but do not relate it to international di⁄erences in labor market institutions.
3￿ exibility.
Our paper is also related to a growing literature that studies the e⁄ects of international dif-
ferences in institutions on trade patterns. Kletzer and Bardhan (1987), Beck (2002), Matsuyama
(2005), and Manova (2008) show how credit market imperfections lead to comparative advantage
when industries di⁄er in their borrowing needs. Levchenko (2004) shows that the quality of insti-
tutions (e.g., property rights, the quality of contract enforcement, shareholder protection) a⁄ects
both trade ￿ ows and the distribution of the gains from trade between rich and poor countries.
Costinot (2009) and Nunn (2007) extend models of trade with imperfect contracts, highlighting a
link between country institutions (linked to contract enforcement) and the pattern of comparative
advantage across sectors with di⁄erent technological characteristics (which a⁄ect the sector￿ s re-
liance on contract enforcement, such as the complexity of production or the need for relation-speci￿c
investments by workers).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 formalizes the paper￿ s basic insights in
a one-factor model. Section 3 extends the model by incorporating a second factor, capital, whose
￿ exibility is not a⁄ected by the labor market institutions ￿and derives the implications for the
pattern of comparative advantage. In Section 4, we present the empirical evidence. Section 5
concludes. The A
ppendix discusses several additional properties of the theoretical model and some of its exten-
sions.
2 The Model
There are two countries, denoted by c = F;H. Each country is endowed with ￿ L units of labor,
which are supplied inelastically (for any positive wage) and internationally immobile. Preferences
are identical across countries. Agents maximize utility over a Cobb-Douglas aggregate Q of a
continuum of ￿nal goods q(i); indexed by i:
Q ￿ exp
￿Z 1
0
lnq (i)di
￿
:
In each industry i; the ￿nal good is produced using a continuum of intermediate goods y(i;z)
according to the technology
y (i) =
￿Z 1
0
y (i;z)
"￿1
" dz
￿ "
"￿1
; (1)
4where y (i) denotes production of the ￿nal good i. We assume that these intermediate goods are
gross substitutes: " > 1 (and thus that the intermediate goods used to produce a given ￿nal good
are less di⁄erentiated than the ￿nal goods across industries). Each intermediate good is produced
with labor only:
y (i;z) = e￿L(i;z);
where ￿ is a stochastic term. Within each ￿nal-good industry, the ￿0s are iid draws from a com-
mon distribution Gi(:) in both countries, with mean 0 and variance ￿2 (i). We refer to ￿2 (i) as
industry i￿ s ￿volatility￿ . This formulation emphasizes shocks to intermediate good producers on
the production side, but is nonetheless isomorphic to a formulation emphasizing demand shocks for
the intermediate good stemming from a stochastic quality term in the production of the ￿nal good
(1).
We assume two di⁄erent institutional scenarios. In country F, all markets are competitive, and
the determination of all prices and the allocation of all resources take place after the realization
of ￿. This captures the idea of a ￿ exible economy that can costlessly reallocate resources towards
their most e¢ cient use. In country H, intermediate good producers must hire workers before the
realization of ￿; no labor adjustment is allowed thereafter. This corresponds to the idea that
rigidities prevent ￿rms from adjusting to changing circumstances. The intermediate good producer
is contractually committed to paying the hired number of workers the economy-wide ex-ante market
clearing wage (regardless of the realization of ￿).7 After the realization of ￿, production and
commodity market clearing take place in a competitive setting, subject to the wage and employment
restrictions.8 Intermediate goods producers anticipate this equilibrium, and adjust their contracted
labor demand accordingly. Given ex-ante free entry into the intermediate goods sector, expected
pro￿ts of the intermediate good producers are driven to zero.9 In the working paper version of
our work, Cuæat and Melitz (2007), we also allow for the possibility of unemployment in the rigid
economy.
7One can think about the rigid economy as an economy where institutions prohibit the enforcement of employment
contracts contingent on the realization of the shock ￿. Following this interpretation, for both the ￿ exible and rigid
economy, employment contracts must be agreed upon before the realization of the shock ￿. The key di⁄erence
between the two economies is that such contracts in the ￿ exible economy can be made contingent upon the future
realization of the shock. This setup obviates the need to appeal to any wage setting institution in the rigid economy.
The equilibrium in the rigid economy is then the competitive outcome contingent on the contractual incompleteness.
8Both the ￿nal good and intermediate good sectors are perfectly competitive. In a given intermediate good sector,
all ￿rms produce with the same realization of ￿.
9The institutional di⁄erences outlined above between the two countries are rather stark. In a companion paper,
Cuæat and Melitz (2009), we show that our entire analysis can be extended to many countries with varying degrees
of labor market ￿ exibility. This degree of labor market ￿ exibility can vary continuously between the extremes of the
￿ exible and rigid economy described above.
5Autarky in the Flexible Country
Let pF;￿(i;z) be the price of the intermediate good z in country F receiving a productivity draw
￿. That good is priced at marginal cost e￿￿wF. The sector-level price is then given by the C.E.S.
aggregator of the intermediate good prices:
pF (i) =
￿Z 1
￿1
pF;￿ (i;z)
1￿" dGi (￿)
￿ 1
1￿"
=
=
wF
hR 1
￿1 e("￿1)￿dGi (￿)
i 1
"￿1
;
where ~ ￿F(i) ￿
hR 1
￿1 e("￿1)￿dGi (￿)
i 1
"￿1 represents the productivity level in industry i. This is
a weighted average of the productivity levels of the intermediate good producers e￿, where the
weights are proportional to the intermediate good￿ s cost share in the production of the ￿nal good.
The corresponding goods and factor market clearing conditions close the model.
Autarky in the Rigid Country
Notice that the law of large numbers ensures there is no aggregate uncertainty within each industry.
We assume that agents hold a diversi￿ed portfolio across ￿rms, and hence that ￿rms maximize
expected pro￿ts. Given that all intermediate-good sectors in industry i are ex-ante identical, there
is no variation in the employment levels LH (i;z) across producers. Of course, the prices pH;￿ (i;z)
and output levels yH;￿ (i;z) will vary with the ex-post productivity draw ￿.
The ex-ante zero-pro￿t condition for an intermediate good producer equates its known labor
cost with expected revenue, hence
wHLH (i;z) =
Z 1
￿1
pH;￿ (i;z)yH;￿ (i;z)dGi (￿): (2)
Market clearing for each intermediate good equates ex-post supply and demand:
e￿LH (i;z) =
￿
pH;￿ (i;z)
pH (i)
￿￿"
yH (i); (3)
where the industry-level price pH (i) is given by the C.E.S. aggregator of the intermediate good
prices:
pH (i) =
￿Z 1
￿1
pH;￿ (i;z)
1￿" dGi (￿)
￿ 1
1￿"
: (4)
6Jointly, these equations (2), (3), and (4) determine the industry-level price
pH (i) =
wH
hR 1
￿1 e
("￿1)
" ￿dGi (￿)
i "
"￿1
;
where ~ ￿H(i) ￿
hR 1
￿1 e
("￿1)
" ￿dGi (￿)
i "
"￿1 represents the productivity level in industry i for the rigid
economy.
As with the productivity ~ ￿F(i) in the ￿ exible economy, this productivity is a weighted av-
erage of the productivity levels of the intermediate good producers. Although the distribution
of these intermediate good productivity levels are identical in both countries (for each sector i),
the productivity averages are di⁄erent as the cost shares of the intermediate goods in ￿nal good
production systematically vary across countries. Final good producers in the ￿ exible country can
take full advantage of the dispersion of productivity levels among intermediate good producers by
optimally shifting their expenditures towards the more productive ones (with lower prices). This
reallocation process is constrained by the labor market rigidities in the other country. This, in turn,
confers an absolute advantage to the ￿ exible economy across all sectors: ~ ￿F(i) ￿ ~ ￿H(i) 8i, where
this inequality is strict whenever Gi(￿) is non-degenerate (and there are idiosyncratic productivity
shocks).10
Notice that our assumptions on the production of the ￿nal good imply a built-in ￿love-of-
volatility￿ : in both countries, average industry productivity increases with ￿ (i). Since cost shares
of intermediate goods in the ￿nal good￿ s production depend positively on ￿, a higher volatility ￿(i)
raises industry productivity in the two countries. The ￿ exible country bene￿ts from this volatility
proportionately more than the rigid country, as the cost shares of intermediate goods are more
sensitive to ￿ in the ￿ exible labor market.
Parametrization of Productivity Draws
In order to simplify some of the ensuing analysis in an open-economy equilibrium, we parametrize
the productivity draws to the normal distribution, thus assuming that ￿ (i) ￿ N
￿
0;￿2 (i)
￿
. Without
loss of generality we assume that the industries are ranked in order of increasing volatility such
that ￿(i) is increasing in i. We further assume that ￿(i) is di⁄erentiable and positive. The average
10This is a direct application of Jensen￿ s inequality.
7industry productivity levels can then be written as
~ ￿F(i) = exp
￿
(" ￿ 1)
￿2 (i)
2
￿
;
~ ￿H(i) = exp
￿
(" ￿ 1)
"
￿2 (i)
2
￿
:
Free Trade
We assume free trade in ￿nal goods, but assume that intermediate goods remain non-traded.
Following Dornbusch et al. (1977), we de￿ne the productivity di⁄erential
A(i) ￿
~ ￿H(i)
~ ￿F(i)
= exp
(
￿
(" ￿ 1)
2
2"
￿2 (i)
)
:
As previously mentioned, labor market ￿ exibility confers an absolute advantage to the ￿ exible
economy: A(i) ￿ 1: However, the labor market institutions also interact with industry volatility to
engender a pattern of Ricardian comparative advantage: A(i) is decreasing in industry volatility
￿2(i). The productivity di⁄erential between the ￿ exible and rigid economy increases with industry
volatility. This confers a comparative advantage to the ￿ exible economy in high-volatility industries.
The free-trade equilibrium is characterized by a wage ratio wH=wF and a marginal commodity
￿ {. For i ￿ ￿ {, wH=wF ￿ A(i), and good i is produced by country H. For i > ￿ {, wH=wF > A(i), and
good i is produced by country F. In equilibrium, the value of world consumption must equal the
value of world output, which is also world labor income: P (QF + QH) = wFLF +wHLH, where P
denotes the price of Q. The value of country H￿ s output, equal to country H￿ s labor income, must
also equal world expenditure on those goods produced in H.11 If H produces goods in the range
[0;i], then wHLH = iP (QF + QH) = i(wFLF + wHLH). Therefore we can write
wH
wF
=
i
1 ￿ i
￿ B (i);
where B0(i) > 0.
The intersection of A(i) and B (i) determines the free-trade equilibrium (see Figure 1). An
overall increase in volatility such that ￿0 (i) > ￿ (i); 8i, causes A(i) to shift down while B(i)
remains unchanged (see again Figure 1). This leads to a decrease in the range of ￿nal goods
produced in H (i.e. a lower ￿ {) and a lower relative wage wH. Such an overall increase in volatility
11This condition is also equivalent to balanced trade.
8(as has been empirically measured in the last half century for the US) thus alters the pattern of
comparative advantage, inducing relative welfare gains for the economy with ￿ exible labor markets.
3 Two Factors
We now develop a two-factor version of our model. We assume that countries are endowed with
both capital and labor, and that industries di⁄er in terms of capital intensity as well as volatility.
The Cobb-Douglas aggregate good Q is now de￿ned according to
Q ￿ exp
￿Z 1
0
Z 1
0
lnq (i;j)didj
￿
;
where an industry is now characterized by a pair (i;j) representing an index for both volatility (i)
and capital intensity (j). The ￿nal good in each industry is still produced from a C.E.S. continuum
of intermediate goods indexed by z:
y (i;j) =
￿Z 1
0
y (i;j;z)
"￿1
" dz
￿ "
"￿1
:
Intermediate goods are now produced with both capital and labor, according to
y (i;j;z) = e￿
￿
K(i;j;z)
￿(j)
￿￿(j) ￿
L(i;j;z)
1 ￿ ￿(j)
￿1￿￿(j)
;
where ￿(j) 2 [0;1] is the industry￿ s cost share of capital and the index of capital intensity. As in the
one-factor model, the ￿0s are iid draws from a common distribution, identical across countries, but
di⁄erent across industries. We maintain the Normal parametrization for the productivity draws
￿ (i) ￿ N
￿
0;￿2 (i)
￿
. Labor market institutions are identical to the single-factor case previously
developed. We assume that, in both countries, the rental rate and the allocation of capital to
intermediate good producers are determined prior to the realization of ￿; no adjustment is allowed
thereafter. In other words, we assume that capital is a ￿fully rigid￿ factor in both countries.
In the Appendix, we show how all our main comparative statics (the ones we test empirically)
remain unchanged when we extend the model to a third factor, which is ￿ exible across countries.
Additionally, similar comparative statics also hold for this ￿fully ￿ exible￿factor. Thus, the key
di⁄erentiating aspect for any factor other than labor is that its degree of rigidity is independent
of di⁄erences in labor market rigidities across countries. These other factors could represent any
9combination of factors that are either ￿fully ￿ exible￿or ￿fully rigid￿ .
Autarky in the Flexible Country
In the Appendix, we show that the ￿nal good price is given by
pF (i;j) =
r
￿(j)
F w
1￿￿(j)
F
~ ￿F(i;j)
;
where the numerator is the standard Cobb-Douglas unit cost function. The industry average
productivity level ~ ￿F(i;j) is then
~ ￿F(i;j) = exp
￿
" ￿ 1
1 + ￿(j)(" ￿ 1)
￿2 (i)
2
￿
:
Notice that for ￿(j) = 0; ~ ￿F(i;j) is identical to the previously derived ~ ￿F(i) for the one-factor case.
As the capital intensity increases, the ability of the ￿nal good producer to reallocate expenditures
across intermediate goods is reduced (since capital is assumed to be rigid), leading to decreases in
average productivity.
Autarky in the Rigid Country
Since factor prices and the allocation of both factors are determined before the realization of ￿,
all intermediate good producers in an industry hire the same amount of capital and labor. The
determination of the ￿nal good price is an immediate extension of the one-factor rigid-country case:
pH (i;j) =
r
￿(j)
H w
1￿￿(j)
H
~ ￿H(i;j)
;
where average productivity ~ ￿H(i;j) is identical to the single factor case:
~ ￿H(i;j) = exp
￿
(" ￿ 1)
"
￿2 (i)
2
￿
:
The Pattern of Comparative Advantage
Without loss of generality, we assume that ￿(j) is an increasing and di⁄erentiable function of j.
As in the one-factor case, we can de￿ne
A(i;j) ￿
~ ￿H(i;j)
~ ￿F(i;j)
= exp
(
￿
(" ￿ 1)
2
2"
1 ￿ ￿(j)
1 + ￿(j)(" ￿ 1)
￿2 (i)
)
10as the ratio of productivity levels for a given industry across the two countries. This ratio highlights,
once again, the absolute productivity advantage of the ￿ exible economy in all sectors: A(i;j) <
1; 8i;j. It also highlights how the pattern of comparative advantage varies with both volatility and
capital intensity. @A(i;j)=@i < 0 as in the one factor case: the productivity advantage is larger in
more volatile industries. However, @A(i;j)=@j > 0: holding volatility constant, this productivity
advantage is reduced in relatively more capital intensive industries. This is intuitive, as a larger
capital share reduces the ability of the ￿ exible economy to take full advantage of the dispersion
in productivity levels.12 Needless to say, international factor price di⁄erences will also a⁄ect the
pattern of comparative advantage. In our empirical work we separately control for these e⁄ects in
order to isolate the e⁄ect of labor market ￿ exibility on country specialization patterns via relative
productivity di⁄erences.
4 Empirical Evidence
Data Construction and Description
Country-Level Data
The key new country-level variable needed to test the predictions of our model is a measure of
labor market rigidity across countries. Following the work of Botero et al. (2004), the World Bank
has collected such measures, which capture di⁄erent dimensions of the rigidity of employment
laws across countries.13 These measures cover three broad employment areas: hiring costs, ￿ring
costs, and restrictions on changing the number of working hours. The World Bank also produces
a combined summary index for each country (weighing the measures in all areas). This variable is
coded on a 100-point integer scale indicating increasing levels of rigidity. We subtract this variable
from 100 to produce a measure of ￿ exibility and use this as our main country labor market ￿ exibility
index, FLEX_c (see Table 1). Unfortunately, historical data is not available, so we only have data
for 2004. We will thus use the most recent data available from other sources to combine with this
data.
Most of our remaining country level variables come from the Penn World Tables (PWT 6.1).
We measure capital abundance (K_c) as the physical capital stock per capita.14 Capital stock
12As was previously noted, these last two comparative statics also hold for a third factor whose use is ￿ exible across
countries.
13This data, along with more detailed descriptions on its collection, is available online at
http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/HiringFiringWorkers/
14We use capital stock per capita, as opposed to per worker, for consistency with the de￿nition of human capital.
11is taken from Caselli (2005) and is constructed from the investment data reported in PWT 6.1
(based on the perpetual inventory method). Human skill abundance (S_c) is calculated as the
average years of schooling in the total population from Barro and Lee (2000).15 We also record
data on real GDP (GDP_c) and real GDP per capita (GDPPC_c). All of the above measures are
available over time, up to 1996 (when data for some countries in our sample are then no longer
available). We thus use the data for 1996 for all countries (and the Barro-Lee data for 1995).
The GDP and capital stock variables are measured in 1996 international dollars. Lastly, we use
a measure of ￿nancial development to control for potential confounding e⁄ects of volatility on the
pattern of comparative advantage operating through a ￿nancial channel (such as those resulting
from ￿nancial frictions). Following Beck (2002), we measure ￿nancial development (FINDEV_c)
as the total credit extended by banks and other non-bank ￿nancial intermediaries to the private
sector, as a fraction of GDP. We use this data for 1996 to concord with the remaining data from
PWT6.1 and Barro and Lee (2000). When we combine these sources of country-level data, we are
left with 81 countries. However, we will most often restrict our analysis to countries with available
GDP per capita levels above $2,000, leaving us with 61 countries.16 Other countries are excluded
from this sample because the Penn World Tables do not have capital stock data for them (most
notably, for Germany and other countries that have recently merged or split-up).17 However, we
will include these countries in our additional robustness checks with our country-level analysis.
Sector-Level Data
Our empirical approach also requires a measure of ￿rm-level volatility across sectors, as well as
standard measures of factor intensities in production. This type of data is not available across
our large sample of countries (at the needed detailed level of sectoral disaggregation), so we rely
on the commonly used assumption that the ranking of measures do not vary across countries.
Although the correlation between the two measures is very high (.98), we found that the capital abundance measure
per capita had slightly more explanatory power than its usual measure per worker. Needless to say, this di⁄erence is
barely noticeable for our main results.
15We also tried alternate measures of skill abundance, such as the fraction of workers that completed high school,
or attained higher education (from Barro and Lee (2000)). These measures were clearly dominated by the one based
on average years of schooling in explaining the pattern of comparative advantage across skill intensive sectors.
16The excluded countries are Benin, Bangladesh, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Congo, Ghana, Kenya,
Mali, Mozambique, Malawi, Niger, Nicaragua, Nepal, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda, and
Zambia. United Arab Emirates, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kiribati are excluded due to missing GDP per capita
data.
17The full list of excluded countries with GDP per capita above $2,000 falling in this category are: Albania, Ar-
menia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Belarus, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Georgia, Guinea, Guyana, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lithuania, Latvia, Morocco, Republic of Moldova, Macedonia, Oman, Russian Feder-
ation, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
12We therefore use a reference country, the US, to measure all these needed sector characteristics.
Factor intensity data in manufacturing are available over time from the NBER-CES Manufacturing
Industry Database at the 4-digit US SIC level (459 industrial sectors). For each sector, we measure
capital intensity (K_s) as capital per worker and skill intensity (S_s) as the ratio of non-production
wages to total wages. We have experimented with other formulations for these factor intensities,
such as those based on the 3-factor model in Romalis (2004), but found that the latter had much
less explanatory power for the pattern of comparative advantage than our preferred measures.18
Again, we use the most recent data available, but also average out the data across the latest 5
available years, 1992-1996, in order to smooth out any small yearly ￿ uctuations (especially for very
small sectors).19 All measures are also aggregated to the 3-digit SIC level (140 sectors).
Concerning ￿rm-level volatility, the Appendix shows there is a direct relationship between the
standard deviation of ￿rm-level shocks, ￿ (i), and the standard deviation of the growth rate of ￿rm
sales (VOL_s).20 We measure di⁄erences in ￿rm-level volatility across sectors using COMPUSTAT
data from Standard & Poor￿ s. This data covers all publicly traded ￿rms in the US, and contains
yearly sales and employment data since 1980 (the past 24 years). We use the standard deviation
of the annual growth rate of ￿rm sales (measured as year-di⁄erenced log sales) as our benchmark
measure of ￿rm volatility.21 Thus, our volatility measure is purged of any trend growth rate in ￿rms
sales. COMPUSTAT records the 4-digit SIC classi￿cation for each ￿rm, although some ￿rms are
only classi￿ed into a 3-digit, and in rarer instances, into a 2-digit SIC classi￿cations. As expected,
the distribution of ￿rms across sectors is highly skewed. In order to obtain data on the largest
possible number of sectors, we include in our analysis all ￿rms with at least 5 years of data (using
all the data going back to 1980) and all sectors with at least 10 ￿rms.22 However, we do not include
any observation where the absolute value of the growth rate is above 300%. This leaves us with
5,216 ￿rms in our sample.
18Another commonly used measure of skill intensity is the ratio of non-production workers to total workers (whereas
we use the ratio of the payments to these factors). These measures have a correlation coe¢ cient of .94, and yield
nearly identical results.
19These factor intensity measures are highly serially correlated (the average serial correlation is .99 for capital
intensity and .97 for skill intensity), so this averaging does not substantially change any of our results.
20The appendix also shows that rewriting the model in terms of VOL_s does not alter the model￿ s comparative
statics discussed above.
21For robustness, we experimented with another measure of volatility based on ￿rm productivity: the standard
deviation of the annual growth rate of sales per worker. Both volatility measures are highly correlated across ￿rms
(.83 correlation ratio).We only report the results obtained with the volatility measure based on sales, as those obtained
with the volatility measure based on sales per worker were very similar.
22We have also experimented with a more stringent requirement of 10 years of data and 20 ￿rms per sector. Our
main results remain unchanged.
13We compute the sector-level measure as the average of the ￿rm-level volatility measures, weighted
by the ￿rm￿ s average employment over time. This yields volatility measures for 94 of the 459 4-
digit sectors and 88 of the 140 3-digit sectors. (Table 4 provides some descriptive statistics for this
variable.) We use volatility measures at the 2-digit level for the remaining sectors (there are 20
such classi￿cations, and there are always enough ￿rms to compute volatility measures at this level).
Often, in these cases, there is only one dominant 4-digit sector within this 2-digit classi￿cation.23
We construct both a 4-digit and a 3-digit level measure of volatility. Whenever a volatility measure
is not available at the desired level of disaggregation, we use the measure from the next lower level
of aggregation.
We favor this measure of volatility based on ￿rms sales over the excess job reallocation measure
by Davis et al. (1997) for both theoretical and empirical reasons. First, from a theoretical perspec-
tive, some of our comparative statics results can no longer be signed when we replace our volatility
variable ￿ (i) with the excess job reallocation proxy. Second, a worker-based measure of volatility
such as excess job reallocation does not capture some of the ￿rm labor adjustments that occur
through the margin of work hours and e⁄ort. Such expansions and contractions in work hours are
common in US manufacturing.
Country-Sector Exports
Instead of only measuring each country￿ s exports into the US (as in Romalis (2004)), we follow the
approach of Nunn (2007) and measure each country￿ s aggregate exports across sectors. This country
export data is available from the World Trade Flows Database (see Feenstra et al. (2005)) for the
years 1962-2000 and is classi￿ed at the 4-digit SITC rev. 2 level. There are 768 distinct such sectors
with recorded trade in the 1990s across all countries. Once we exclude non-manufacturing sectors,
and concord the remaining sectors to the US SIC classi￿cation, we are left with 370 sectors.24 Again,
we wish to use the most recent data available, but also want to smooth the e⁄ects of any year-to-
23If COMPUSTAT only records a ￿rm￿ s sector at the 2- or 3-digit level, then we use that ￿rm for the relevant
classi￿cation. We also aggregate all ￿rms with 4-digit level sector information into their respective 2- and 3-digit
classi￿cations.
24Since publicly available concordances from SITC rev.2 to US SIC do not indicate proportions on how individual
SITC codes should be allocated to separate SIC codes, we construct our own concordance. We use export data for
the US, that is recorded at the Harmonized System (HS) level (roughly 15,000 product codes). For each HS code,
both an SITC and an SIC code is listed. We aggregate up the value of US exports over all HS codes for the last 10
available data years (1991-2000) across distinct SITC and SIC pairs. For each SITC code, we record the percentage
of US exports across distinct SIC codes. We then concord exports for all countries from SITC to SIC codes using
these percentage allocations. In most cases, this percentage is very high, so our use of US trade as a benchmark
cannot induce any serious biases. For 50% of SITC codes, the percentage assigned to one SIC code is above 98%.
For 75% of SITC codes, this percentage is above 76%.
14year ￿ uctuations in the distribution of exports across sectors (again, we are mostly concerned with
smaller sectors where aggregate country exports can be more volatile). For this reason, we average
exports over the last 10 years of available data, for 1991-2000. This yields our measure of aggregate
exports, Xsc, across sectors and countries. We also aggregate this variable to the 3-digit SIC level
(134 distinct classi￿cations are available).
Pooled Country-Sector Analysis
Our baseline speci￿cation is:
logXsc = ￿0 + ￿vf (VOL_s ￿ logFLEX_c) + ￿kf (logK_s ￿ logFLEX_c)+ (5)
+￿kk (logK_s ￿ logK_c) + ￿ss (logS_s ￿ logS_c) + ￿s + ￿c + "sc;
where ￿s and ￿c are sector and country level ￿xed e⁄ects. Given these ￿xed e⁄ects, our speci￿cation
is equivalent to one where exports are measured as a share or as a ratio relative to the exports of
a given reference country. Similarly, the speci￿cation is also equivalent to one where the country
characteristics are measured as di⁄erences relative to a reference country. All data measures (except
for VOL_s) are entered in logs (VOL_s is a summary statistic of a logged variable).
Our model predicts ￿vf > 0: countries with more ￿ exible labor markets export relatively more
in relatively more volatile sectors.25 Additionally, our model predicts ￿kf < 0: after controlling for
the e⁄ects of volatility across sectors, countries with less ￿ exible labor markets export relatively
more in relatively more capital intensive sectors (since the e⁄ect of volatility is relatively less severe
as capital intensity increases). The similar traditional comparative advantage predictions, based
on factor abundance and factor intensity, are ￿kk > 0 and ￿ss > 0. Since our volatility measure
is not uniformly available at the 4-digit SIC level, we test these predictions using both the data
at the 4-digit level and 3-digit level. To ensure that our results are not dominated by low-income
countries, we also include speci￿cations where we exclude all countries with GDP per capita below
$5,000 (leaving us with 42 countries with available capital stock data).
The results from the OLS regressions of equation (5) across the di⁄erent data samples are listed
25This is a very ￿demanding￿interpretation of the theory, since the latter does not imply a monotonic relationship
across sectors and countries in a multi-country world. For example, a country with mid-range labor market ￿ exibility
could concentrate its exports in sectors with mid-range volatility. This e⁄ect would not get picked up by our regression
analysis, which is searching for di⁄erences in slopes, given a monotonic linear response of export shares across sectors
for a country.
15in Table 5. We ￿nd strong con￿rmation both for the predictions of our model and the traditional
forces of specialization according to comparative advantage. The table lists the standardized beta
coe¢ cients, which capture the e⁄ects of raising the independent variables by one standard deviation
(measured in standard deviations of the dependent variable). The magnitude of the coe¢ cient on
the volatility-￿ exibility interaction is of the same magnitude, though higher, than those reported
by Nunn (2007) and Levchenko (2004) for the e⁄ects of institutional quality on the pattern of
comparative advantage. Table 5 shows that the level of sector disaggregation does not greatly
in￿ uence the results, though the magnitude of the coe¢ cients are a little higher at the more
aggregated 3-digit level. We thus continue our analysis using only the 3-digit level data.
Since the regressions in Table 5 do not include observations where no exports are recorded for a
given country, the results should be interpreted as capturing the pattern of comparative advantage
for countries across all of its export sectors ￿and not the e⁄ect of comparative advantage on the
country-level decision to export in particular sectors (which are likely a⁄ected by other additional
sector and country characteristics). We maintain this interpretation throughout our analysis, but
also provide an additional robustness check in Table 6, where the reported regressions have used
all potential country-sector combinations: we add missing export observations with zero exports,
then add 1 to all export values before taking logs. (Tobit speci￿cations censored at zero yield
extremely similar results to those reported in Table 6.) This table shows that all our results remain
strongly signi￿cant, though the magnitude of most of the coe¢ cients drops substantially (this e⁄ect
is most pronounced for the skill intensity ￿skill abundance coe¢ cient, whereas the capital intensity
￿capital abundance coe¢ cient is mostly una⁄ected).
We next con￿rm that our results are not driven by other country and sector characteristics
outside of our model. In recent work, Koren and Tenreyro (2005) have shown that increasing levels
of economic development across countries are associated with a pattern of comparative advantage
towards less volatile sectors ￿where this volatility is measured as the aggregate sector volatility
of output per worker. We replicate their results by computing a similar measure of aggregate
productivity volatility from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Productivity database. We measure
the volatility of sector-level output per worker (VOLPROD_AGG_s) using the same methods as
the ￿rm-level volatility measures: taking the standard deviation of its annual growth rate. We
then add an additional control for the interaction between this measure of aggregate productivity
volatility and development (measured as the log of GDP per capita). The results are reported in the
￿rst two columns of Table 7. They show that a country￿ s level of development is correlated with
16its pattern of comparative advantage across sectors with lower aggregate productivity volatility.
This e⁄ect is very signi￿cant and important when the low-income countries, with GDP per capita
between $2,000 and $5,000, are included in the sample (the results for this added regressor are also
substantially stronger at the 4-digit level for countries above the $5,000 GDP per capita threshold).
Nonetheless, the table also shows that our main results on the e⁄ect of labor market ￿ exibility on
the pattern of comparative advantage remain una⁄ected.
We next show that the driving force behind the e⁄ect of volatility on the pattern of comparative
advantage operates at the ￿rm-level and not at the sector-level. We construct a sector-level measure
of sales volatility, VOL_AGG_s, following the same procedure as that outlined for aggregate
productivity volatility (also using the NBER-CES Manufacturing data). We then interact this
sector level variable with labor market ￿ exibility and include it as an additional regressor. The
results, reported in the third and fourth columns of Table 7, clearly show that this aggregate
volatility has no measurable e⁄ect on the pattern of comparative advantage.
Lastly, we add two additional sets of controls. One set includes interactions of country factor
abundance measures (K_c and S_c) with sector volatility VOL_s. This controls for any other
possible interactions between factor abundance (and their e⁄ects on factor prices) and sector level
volatility. For example, Bernard et al. (2007) show how there can be a possible interaction between
comparative advantage (via di⁄erences in factor abundance) and volatility (via higher levels of
simultaneous entry and exit due to a higher survival threshold). The other set is comprised of
interactions between the level of development and all three sector-level measures, VOL_s, K_s,
and S_s. We used GDP per capita as our main measure of development and add interactions
between that variable and all three sector level measures. Since volatility may also interact with
￿nancial development, we add a separate interaction between ￿nancial development and our sector
level volatility variable. These additional interactions control for other country-level determinants
driving the pattern of comparative advantage. This last set of results is reported in the last two
columns of Table 7. The addition of the interactions with GDP per capita strongly a⁄ects the
magnitude of the predictions for the standard sources of comparative advantage (capital and skill
abundance interacted with that factor￿ s intensity in production): these coe¢ cients drop signi￿cantly
in almost all cases (except for the capital interaction coe¢ cient in the larger sample including the
lower-income countries).26 Most importantly, however, the key coe¢ cients of interest for labor
26The results further show that GDP per capita, rather than direct measures of skill abundance, captures relatively
more of the variation across countries explaining specialization in skill-intensive sectors.
17market ￿ exibility are not substantially a⁄ected by the additional controls; they retain their strong
statistical signi￿cance.27
Country-Level Analysis
We now address some potential limitations in the pooled country-sector analysis by moving to a
country-level analysis. Our main concern is that the previous results do not adequately re￿ ect the
very skewed pattern of country exports across sectors ￿as they can be in￿ uenced by country-sector
pairs with relatively very low exports. We are also concerned that our key measure of volatility is
available at di⁄erent levels of aggregation (representing di⁄erent overall levels of economic activity).
To address these concerns, we construct a country average level of volatility: for each country, sector
level volatility is averaged using its export share as a weight. Speci￿cally, average country volatility
VOL_c is obtained as
VOL_c =
X
s
Xsc
Xc
VOL_s.
Thus, countries with higher export shares in more volatile sectors will have higher levels of this
volatility average. This average also naturally handles the skewness of the distribution of country
level exports by assigning larger weights to more important sectors. We use the 4-digit measure of
volatility, as the averaging also naturally handles the di⁄erent levels of aggregation, by essentially
splitting o⁄sectors with available 4-digit volatility data into separate sectors, and keeping the other
sectors grouped by their inherent level of disaggregation. We can thus test whether countries with
more ￿ exible labor markets have a comparative advantage in relatively more volatile sectors by
examining the correlation across countries between VOL_c and FLEX_c.28
We control for the in￿ uence of other comparative advantage forces in two separate ways. By
introducing other country-level controls in a regression of VOL_c on FLEX_c; and alternatively
by ￿rst purging the sector volatility measure VOL_s of any correlation with other relevant sector
characteristics, and then looking at the direct correlation between the country level average of
this purged volatility measure (VOL_PURGED_c) and FLEX_c. Table 8 reports the results
27Using some additional parametrization assumptions, Chor (2009) develops an empirical estimation of the determi-
nants of comparative advantage using bilateral export data (instead of country-level exports). In some speci￿cations,
he includes a very large set of institutional determinants of comparative advantage that have been highlighted in re-
cent work (including the interaction between labor market ￿ exibility and volatility motivated by our work). In those
speci￿cations, Chor (2009) ￿nds that this interaction term remains signi￿cant, even when all the other institutional
determinants of comparative advantage are also included (i.e. also controlled for).
28One other advantage of this country-level method is that, unlike in the pooled country-sector analysis above, it
does not require a monotonic response in a country￿ s share of exports across sectors to detect a pattern of comparative
advantage.
18corresponding to the regression of the un-purged country volatility average (VOL_c) on labor
market ￿ exibility, also including additional country controls (GDPPC_c, S_c, and log(K_c)).29
Here, we add two additional sample groups of countries: one with a higher GDP per capita cuto⁄
of $10,000, and another including the full sample of available countries by weighting them using the
log of real GDP. The results show the strong independent contribution of labor market ￿ exibility
on the pattern of comparative advantage ￿across all country sample groups.
Lastly, we turn to the second approach discussed above. We use all the previously used sector-
level measures (K_s, S_s, VOL_AGG_s), as well as measures of the intensity of intermediate
goods (material cost per worker) and energy use (energy spending per worker). We also include
a measure of external ￿nance dependence for the sector based on COMPUSTAT data from 1990-
99.30 This controls for an e⁄ect of volatility on the pattern of comparative advantage via a ￿-
nancial channel. We run an initial regression of VOL_s on all these sector level controls, and
construct the residual as VOL_PURGED_s (its correlation coe¢ cient with VOL_s is .93). Table
9 reports the correlation coe¢ cients (which are also the standardized beta coe¢ cients) between
VOL_PURGED_c and FLEX_c across all the country samples from Table 8, including an ad-
ditional group of OECD countries (with membership in the 1990s).31 As the table results clearly
show, there is a very strong correlation between country-level ￿ exibility and this average volatility,
across all sub-samples of countries: all correlation coe¢ cients are signi￿cant well beyond the 1%
level. Figures 2-4 show the scatter plots for these relationships for di⁄erent country samples.
5 Concluding Remarks
Comparative advantage can arise even when the genuine production capabilities (resources and
technologies) of countries are identical, provided they di⁄er in labor market institutions. Countries
with more ￿ exible labor markets should display a comparative advantage precisely where the ability
to adjust is more important, that is, industries subject to high-variance shocks. The empirical
evidence presented above supports the validity of this intuition for a large sample of countries:
more ￿ exible countries export relatively more in high volatility industries.
29We introduce the capital stock per worker variable in logs, since it varies by an order of magnitude greater than
for the other independent country-level variables. Entering this control in levels instead does not substantially change
the results.
30Following the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998), the measure of external ￿nance dependence is calculated
as the fraction of a ￿rm￿ s total capital expenditures that is not ￿nanced by internal cash ￿ ows. The value for the
median ￿rm in each SIC sector is used.
31We can use this much smaller sample of countries since we are not losing any degrees of freedom with additional
country co-variates.
19This result has some interesting implications. First, labor market reform is likely to have
asymmetric e⁄ects across industries. Second, a rigid economy has an alternative to the liberalization
of its labor market to improve its welfare: it can always liberalize trade and ￿import ￿ exibility￿
from a more ￿ exible trading partner. Finally, an extension of the model might provide an additional
explanation for the outsourcing phenomenon: production of intermediate goods may be relocated
to more ￿ exible labor markets in high-volatility industries.
20Table 1: Country Labor Market Flexibility Index, by GDP per Capita Cuto⁄
Name FLEX_c name2 FLEX_c name2 FLEX_c
Morocco* 30 Mexico 28 Spain 31
Ukraine* 36 Brazil 28 France 34
Guinea* 41 Paraguay 41 Greece 34
Uzbekistan* 42 Venezuela 44 Portugal 42
Indonesia 43 Turkey 45 Germany* 45
Peru 45 Belarus* 46 Slovenia* 47
Algeria 45 Tunisia 46 Argentina 49
Moldova* 46 South Africa 48 Italy 50
Egypt 47 Colombia 49 Finland 56
El Salvador 48 Latvia* 51 Netherlands 57
Ecuador 49 Estonia* 56 Sweden 57
Georgia* 51 Thailand 58 Austria 60
India 52 Lithuania* 59 Oman* 65
Philippines 59 Hungary 60 Republic of Korea 66
Bolivia 60 Iran 60 Israel 67
Dominican Republic 60 Costa Rica 65 Norway 70
Guatemala 60 Poland 66 Ireland 71
Sri Lanka 60 Uruguay 69 Czech Republic* 72
Kyrgyzstan* 62 Bulgaria* 72 Japan 76
Azerbaijan* 62 Kazakhstan* 73 Belgium 80
Macedonia* 62 Russian Federation* 73 United Kingdom 80
Syria 63 Fiji 79 Kuwait* 80
Armenia* 64 Chile 81 Switzerland 83
Jordan 66 Slovakia* 90 Australia 83
Honduras 69 Malaysia 97 Denmark 83
China 70 Saudi Arabia* 87
Albania* 70 New Zealand 93
Lebanon* 72 Canada 96
Zimbabwe 76 United States 97
Papua New Guinea 83 Singapore 100
Jamaica 90 Hong Kong 100
2,000 < GDPPC_c = 5,000 5,000 < GDPPC_c = 10,000 GDPPC_c > 10,000
Notes: * Countries with missing data on physical or human capital abundance.
21Table 2: Job Reallocation: Comparing US and Portugal
Quarterly job creation and destruction, all manufacturing sectors
(Source: Blanchard and Portugal (2001))
Job Creation Job Destruction Job Reallocation
Portugal 4 3.9 7.9
(1991:1-1995:4)
US 6.8 7.3 14
(1972:2-1993:4)
22Table 3: Variation in Job Reallocation Rates Across Sectors
Average annual excess job reallocation rates,
US manufacturing sectors
(Source: Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1997))
Percentile Excess Job Reallocation
1% 4.1
5% 6.2
10% 7.4
25% 9.9
50% 12.9
75% 15.8
90% 19.4
95% 21.7
99% 25.6
Size-Weighted Mean 13.2
Industry Observations 514
23Table 4: The Ten Least and Most Volatile Sectors at the 3-Digit SIC Level
SIC-3 VOL_s # firms Description
203 0.084 33 Preserved Fruits & Vegetables
386 0.096 42 Photographic Equipment & Supplies
285 0.097 16 Paints & Allied Products
271 0.100 24 Newspapers
276 0.103 15 Manifold Business Forms
358 0.103 52 Refrigeration & Service Machinery
267 0.105 48 Misc. Converted Paper Products
342 0.105 24 Cutlery, Handtools, & Hardware
314 0.112 25 Footwear, Except Rubber
327 0.115 25 Concrete, Gypsum, & Plaster Products
SIC-3 VOL_s # firms Description
333 0.236 20 Primary Nonferrous Metals
302 0.247 10 Rubber & Plastics Footwear
355 0.255 104 Special Industry Machinery
274 0.262 16 Miscellaneous Publishing
332 0.263 13 Iron & Steel Foundries
346 0.265 20 Metal Forgings & Stampings
202 0.287 17 Dairy Products
369 0.300 59 Misc. Electrical Equipment & Supplies
367 0.306 316 Electronic Components & Accessories
361 0.336 17 Electric Distribution Equipment
24Table 5: Pooled Regression ￿Baseline
SIC aggregation SIC-4 SIC-3 SIC-4 SIC-3
GDPPC cutoff 2000 2000 5000 5000
VOL_s * log FLEX_c 0.300 0.298 0.356 0.382
(0.060) *** (0.073) *** (0.070) *** (0.083) ***
log K_s * log FLEX_c -0.239 -0.300 -0.173 -0.223
(0.069) *** (0.094) *** (0.080) ** (0.114) *
log K_s * log K_c 0.773 1.055 0.546 1.057
(0.092) *** (0.119) *** (0.169) *** (0.232) ***
log S_s * log S_c 0.802 0.961 0.822 0.973
(0.063) *** (0.091) *** (0.077) *** (0.102) ***
Observations 13203 6513 9739 4675
R-squared 0.7016 0.7481 0.6913 0.7472
Notes: Beta coe¢ cients are reported. Country and sector dummies suppressed. Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors in parentheses. * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
25Table 6: Pooled Regression ￿Including Obsevations with No Exports
SIC aggregation SIC-4 SIC-3 SIC-4 SIC-3
GDPPC cutoff 2000 2000 5000 5000
VOL_s * log FLEX_c 0.097 0.165 0.113 0.189
(0.039) ** (0.059) *** (0.038) *** (0.060) ***
log K_s * log FLEX_c -0.168 -0.141 -0.162 -0.121
(0.039) *** (0.063) ** (0.041) *** (0.069) *
log K_s * log K_c 0.803 0.800 0.829 0.737
(0.050) *** (0.082) *** (0.085) *** (0.148) ***
log S_s * log S_c 0.286 0.353 0.242 0.424
(0.041) *** (0.065) *** (0.040) *** (0.062) ***
Observations 22753 8235 14574 5544
R-squared 0.8041 0.8288 0.8564 0.8667
Notes: Beta coe¢ cients are reported. Country and sector dummies suppressed. Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors in parentheses. * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%. All
potential country-sector combinations are represented.
26Table 7: Pooled Regression ￿Robustness Checks
SIC aggregation SIC-3 SIC-3 SIC-3 SIC-3 SIC-3 SIC-3
GDPPC cutoff 2000 5000 2000 5000 2000 5000
VOL_s * log FLEX_c 0.289 0.374 0.304 0.373 0.235 0.262
(0.073) *** (0.083) *** (0.074) *** (0.084) *** (0.090) *** (0.111) **
log K_s * log FLEX_c -0.297 -0.219 -0.323 -0.218 -0.307 -0.245
(0.094) *** (0.114) * (0.094) *** (0.112) * (0.095) *** (0.121) **
log K_s * log K_c 1.155 1.139 1.165 1.138 1.258 0.177
(0.123) *** (0.236) *** (0.123) *** (0.236) *** (0.541) ** (0.745)
log S_s * log S_c 0.936 0.959 0.938 0.959 0.445 0.299
(0.091) *** (0.102) *** (0.091) *** (0.102) *** (0.148) *** (0.144) **
VOLPROD_AGG_s * log GDPPC_c -0.287 -0.238 -0.314 -0.235 -0.274 -0.138
(0.097) *** (0.177) (0.099) *** (0.193) (0.100) *** (0.195)
VOL_AGG_s * log FLEX_c 0.124 -0.005 0.111 -0.0313
(0.102) (0.127) (0.103) (0.128)
VOL_s * log K_c 0.444 1.591
(0.433) (0.679) **
VOL_s * log S_c 0.0728 0.0688
(0.077) (0.090)
VOL_s * log FINDEV_c 0.0200 0.0350
(0.035) (0.046)
VOL_s * log GDPPC_c -0.355 -1.059
(0.342) (0.565) *
log K_s * log GDPPC_c -0.115 0.720
(0.429) (0.612)
log S_s * log GDPPC_c 0.805 1.333
(0.171) *** (0.235) ***
Observations 6513 4675 6513 4675 6513 4675
R-squared 0.7487 0.7474 0.7488 0.7474 0.7499 0.7502
Notes: Beta coe¢ cients are reported. Country and sector dummies suppressed. Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors in parentheses. * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%.
27Table 8: Country-Level Analysis
GDPPC cutoff 10000 5000 2000 NONE (weighted)
FLEX_c 0.820 0.574 0.292 0.275
(0.259) *** (0.169) *** (0.137) ** (0.109) **
GDPPC_c -0.394 -0.657 -0.212 -0.259
(0.412) (0.428) (0.361) (0.183)
S_c -0.215 -0.216 0.187 0.341
(0.207) (0.205) (0.208) (0.178) *
log K_c 0.469 1.052 0.382 0.259
(0.337) (0.412) ** (0.361) (0.235)
Observations 25 42 61 81
R-squared 0.4728 0.4354 0.2744 0.4690
Notes: Beta coe¢ cients are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at
5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%. Last column is weighted by RGDP
28Table 9: Country-Level Analysis: Correlation between Purged Average Volatility and Country
Flexibility
OECD 10000 5000 2000 NONE (weighted)
0.5831 0.5379 0.4471 0.3092 0.4773
(0.0055) (0.0018) (0.0006) (0.0036) (0.0000)
Observations 21 31 56 87 121
Notes: Correlation coe¢ cients are reported. p-values in parentheses. Last column is weighted by RGDP
29Figure 1: One-factor model: equilibrium and comparative statics
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30Figure 2: Average volatility and labor market ￿ exibility (GDP per capita > $5,000)
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31Figure 3: Average volatility and labor market ￿ exibility (GDP per capita > $10,000)
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32Figure 4: Average volatility and labor market ￿ exibility (OECD countries in 1990s)
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33Appendix
A Two-Factor Model: Autarky in the Flexible Country32
Since the rental rate and the allocation of capital are pre-determined prior to the realization of ￿,
all intermediate good producers in an industry hire the same amount of capital K. Hence,
y￿
y0
= e￿
￿
L￿
L0
￿1￿￿
: (A.1)
Market clearing for each ￿rm￿ s output y￿ and price p￿ implies
y￿
y0
=
￿
p￿
p0
￿￿"
: (A.2)
Firms hire labor until the value of its marginal product is equal to the common wage:
w = ￿(￿)p￿ (1 ￿ ￿)e￿K￿L￿￿
￿ ; (A.3)
where ￿(￿) = ￿￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿1. Equations (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) yield
p￿
p0
= exp
￿
￿￿
1 + ￿(" ￿ 1)
￿
; (A.4)
and
L￿
L0
= exp
￿
(" ￿ 1)
1 + ￿(" ￿ 1)
￿
￿
:
Equations (A.2) and (A.4) imply
p￿y￿
p0y0
= exp
￿
(" ￿ 1)
1 + ￿(" ￿ 1)
￿
￿
: (A.5)
Since labor is paid the value of its marginal product, the Cobb-Douglas production function and
zero pro￿t condition imply that each ￿rm pays a share (1 ￿ ￿) of its revenue p￿y￿ to labor: wL￿ =
(1 ￿ ￿)p￿y￿. This relationship also holds in the aggregate for the industry: wL = (1 ￿ ￿)py.
As there are no ex-ante pro￿ts, wages adjust such that the aggregate capital cost rK equals the
32In what follows, country and industry notation is suppressed for simplicity wherever unnecessary. It is understood
that ￿ and ￿ will vary across industries.
34remaining ￿ share of revenue:
rK = ￿
Z 1
￿1
p￿y￿dG(￿) = ￿p0y0 exp
(￿
(" ￿ 1)
1 + ￿(" ￿ 1)
￿2 ￿2
2
)
: (A.6)
Using expressions w = ￿(￿)(1 ￿ ￿)p0 (K=L0)
￿ and wL0 = (1 ￿ ￿)p0y0, which imply that p0y0 =
[￿(￿)]
1=￿ [w=(1 ￿ ￿)]
(￿￿1)=￿ p
1=￿
0 K, equation (A.6) can be written as
r￿w1￿￿ = p0 exp
(
￿
￿
(" ￿ 1)
1 + ￿(" ￿ 1)
￿2 ￿2
2
)
; (A.7)
where the left-hand side is the standard Cobb-Douglas unit cost function. Finally, note that (A.4)
implies that the price index for the ￿nal good is given by
p = p0 exp
(
￿
￿
(" ￿ 1)
1 + ￿(" ￿ 1)
￿2 1
" ￿ 1
￿2
2
)
:
Solving out for p0 using equation (A.7) yields
p = exp
￿
￿
(" ￿ 1)
1 + ￿(" ￿ 1)
￿2
2
￿
r￿w1￿￿:
One can think of our static set-up as a steady-state equilibrium: the law of large numbers ensures
that aggregate outcomes are invariant over time, but the realizations of ￿ experienced by an in-
dividual ￿rm vary from period to period. Assume ￿ is iid over time. From equation (A.5), the
growth rate of a ￿rm￿ s sales between periods t and t0 can be expressed as
￿ ￿ log
p￿0y￿0
p￿y￿
=
(" ￿ 1)(￿0 ￿ ￿)
1 + ￿(" ￿ 1)
:
The standard deviation of ￿ is then
volF (i;j) =
p
2(" ￿ 1)
1 + ￿(j)(" ￿ 1)
￿ (i): (A.8)
The one-factor/￿ exible-country counterpart to equation (A.8) can be obtained by assuming ￿(j) =
0: volF (i) =
p
2(" ￿ 1)￿ (i). Assuming ￿(j) = 1 yields the case of a one-factor model in which the
factor is ￿ rigid￿ : volF (i) =
p
2(" ￿ 1)￿ (i)=". In the two-factor/rigid-country case, we can think
of the two rigid factors as combining into a composite rigid factor. The prediction for volatility is
35clearly the same in this case:
volH (i;j) =
p
2(" ￿ 1)
"
￿ (i) < volF (i;j):
Not surprisingly, ￿rm sales in the rigid country vary less than in the ￿ exible country, as ￿rms cannot
adjust their employment in the rigid country.
B Three Factors
Assume now that countries use three factors in the production of intermediates: a ￿rigid￿factor,
capital, a ￿￿ exible￿factor, materials, and labor. Industries di⁄er in terms of factor intensities and
volatility. The Cobb-Douglas aggregate good Q is now de￿ned according to
Q ￿ exp
￿Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
lnq (i;j;m)didjdm
￿
;
where an industry is now characterized by a triple (i;j;m). The ￿nal good in each industry is still
produced from a C.E.S. continuum of intermediate goods indexed by z:
y (i;j;m) =
￿Z 1
0
y (i;j;m;z)
"￿1
" dz
￿ "
"￿1
;
Intermediate goods are now produced with capital, materials, and labor, according to
y (i;j;m;z) = e￿
￿
K(i;j;m;z)
￿(j)
￿￿(j) ￿
M(i;j;m;z)
￿ (m)
￿￿(m) ￿
L(i;j;m;z)
1 ￿ ￿(j) ￿ ￿ (m)
￿1￿￿(j)￿￿(m)
;
where ￿(j);￿ (m);1￿￿(j)￿￿ (m) 2 [0;1] are the industry￿ s cost shares of capital, materials, and
labor, respectively. As in the one-factor model, the ￿0s are iid draws from a common distribution,
identical across countries, but di⁄erent across industries. We maintain the Normal parametrization
for the productivity draws ￿ (i) ￿ N
￿
0;￿2 (i)
￿
. Labor market ￿ exibility varies across countries in
the same way as before. We assume that, in both countries, the rental rate and the allocation of
capital to intermediate good producers are determined prior to the realization of ￿; no adjustment
is allowed thereafter. Materials are instead allocated after the realization of ￿ in both countries.33
33Assuming ￿ (m) = 0 for all m would yield the two-factor model with rigid capital that we discussed in Section
3. Assuming instead ￿(j) = 0 for all j would yield a two-factor model with the second factor, materials, being
￿ exible in both countries. As we mentioned above, the properties of these models are qualitatively similar. Finally,
￿(j) = ￿ (m) = 0 8j;m yields the one-factor model of Section 2.
36Autarky in the Flexible Country
This case is similar to the two-factor model with ￿ exible labor and rigid capital: we can rewrite
the ￿rm-level production function as
y (i;j;m;z) = e￿
￿
K(i;j;m;z)
￿(j)
￿￿(j)
2
4
￿
M(i;j;m;z)
￿ (m)
￿ ￿(m)
1￿￿(j) ￿
L(i;j;m;z)
1 ￿ ￿(j) ￿ ￿ (m)
￿ 1￿￿(j)￿￿(m)
1￿￿(j)
3
5
1￿￿(j)
;
where the term in brackets can be understood as a composite ￿ exible factor, and K as a rigid
factor. Therefore,
pF (i;j;m) =
r
￿(j)
F s
￿(m)
F w
1￿￿(j)￿￿(m)
F
~ ￿F(i;j;m)
;
where s denotes the price of materials, the numerator is the standard Cobb-Douglas unit cost
function, and the industry average productivity level ~ ￿F(i;j;m) is now given by
~ ￿F(i;j;m) = exp
￿
" ￿ 1
1 + ￿(j)(" ￿ 1)
￿2 (i)
2
￿
:
From the two-factor analysis above, we also derive
volF (i;j;m) =
p
2(" ￿ 1)￿ (i)
1 + ￿(j)(" ￿ 1)
: (B.1)
Autarky in the Rigid Country
We can rewrite the ￿rm-level production function as
y (i;j;m;z) = e￿
￿
M(i;j;m;z)
￿ (m)
￿￿(m)
2
4
￿
K(i;j;m;z)
￿(j)
￿ ￿(j)
1￿￿(m) ￿
L(i;j;m;z)
1 ￿ ￿(j) ￿ ￿ (m)
￿ 1￿￿(j)￿￿(m)
1￿￿(m)
3
5
1￿￿(m)
;
where the term in brackets can be understood as a composite rigid factor, and M as a ￿ exible
factor. Therefore,
pH (i;j;m) =
r
￿(j)
H s
￿(m)
H w
1￿￿(j)￿￿(m)
H
~ ￿H(i;j;m)
;
where the industry average productivity level ~ ￿H(i;j;m) is now given by
~ ￿H(i;j;m) = exp
￿
(" ￿ 1)
1 + [1 ￿ ￿ (m)](" ￿ 1)
￿2 (i)
2
￿
:
37From the two-factor analysis above, we also know
volH (i;j;m) =
p
2(" ￿ 1)￿ (i)
1 + [1 ￿ ￿ (m)](" ￿ 1)
:
The Pattern of Comparative Advantage
Without loss of generality, we assume that ￿(m) is an increasing and di⁄erentiable function of m.
As in the one-factor and two-factor cases, we can de￿ne
A(i;j;m) ￿
~ ￿H(i;j;m)
~ ￿F(i;j;m)
= exp
(
￿
(" ￿ 1)
2
2
1 ￿ ￿(j) ￿ ￿ (m)
[1 + ￿(j)(" ￿ 1)][1 + [1 ￿ ￿ (m)](" ￿ 1)]
￿2 (i)
)
(B.2)
as the ratio of productivity levels for a given industry across the two countries. This ratio high-
lights, once again, the absolute productivity advantage of the ￿ exible economy in all sectors:
A(i;j;m) < 1; 8i;j;m. It also highlights how the pattern of comparative advantage varies with
both volatility and factor intensity. @A(i;j;m)=@i < 0 as in the one factor case: the productivity
advantage is larger in more volatile industries. However, @A(i;j;m)=@j > 0; @A(i;j;m)=@m > 0:
holding volatility constant, this productivity advantage is reduced in relatively less labor intensive
industries. A smaller labor share share reduces the ability of the ￿ exible economy to take full
advantage of the dispersion in productivity levels.
Empirical Measurement of Volatility and Comparative Advantage
In this section, we show how the same comparative statics for comparative advantage are obtained
when they are evaluated in terms of our observed measure of volatility volF(i;j;m): the standard
deviation of log sales across ￿rms in a sector, for an economy with a ￿ exible labor market (the
US).34 Substituting equation (B.1) into equation (B.2) yields
A(i;j;m) = exp
￿
￿
1
4
￿(j;m)vol2
F (i;j;m)
￿
;
where
￿(j;m) =
[1 ￿ ￿(j) ￿ ￿ (m)][1 + ￿(j)(" ￿ 1)]
[1 + [1 ￿ ￿ (m)](" ￿ 1)]
> 0:
34We note that the same comparative statics would also hold if they were evaluated for a country with a rigid labor
market. Choosing the case of a ￿ exible labor market seemed most appropriate since the empirical measure is based
on US ￿rms.
38Thus, the comparative statics for A(i;j;m) in terms of volF are identical to those in terms of ￿2(i):
relative productivity A(i;j;m) varies negatively with volatility for both measures. We now turn
to the secondary e⁄ect of labor market ￿ exibility based on variations in factor intensities. Some
tedious algebra yields
@￿[￿(j);￿ (m)]
@￿(j)
=
(" ￿ 1)[1 ￿ 2￿(j) ￿ ￿ (m)] ￿ 1
[(1 ￿ ￿ (m))" + ￿ (m)]
;
@￿[￿(j);￿ (m)]
@￿ (m)
= ￿
￿
￿(j)" + 1 ￿ ￿(j)
(1 ￿ ￿ (m))" + ￿ (m)
￿2
:
Clearly, @￿[￿(j);￿ (m)]=@￿ (m) < 0. Although the sign of @￿[￿(j);￿ (m)]=@￿(j) is analytically
ambiguous, we document that this derivative is negative for virtually all empirical measures of ￿(j)
and ￿(m) across sectors, combined with plausible values for ". @￿[￿(j);￿ (m)]=@￿(j) < 0 if and
only if
2￿(j) + ￿(m) >
" ￿ 2
" ￿ 1
: (B.3)
The RHS of (B.3) is increasing in ". Even for an upper-bound value for " of 10, the RHS is below
:9.35 We can evaluate the empirical distribution of the LHS of (B.3) across all U.S. SIC sectors
that we use in our empirical analysis. We use expenditures on energy and materials as a share
of the gross value of production to represent ￿(m). We compute a similar share for expenditures
on labor, and compute ￿(j) as the residual share, 1 minus the sum of the other shares (labor and
￿(m)). At the SIC-3 level, the LHS for all sectors is bounded below by .9. At the SIC-4 level, 98%
of sectors have a LHS value above .9. Thus, empirically, (B.3) will be satis￿ed for all SIC-3 sectors
and almost all the SIC-4 sectors. We therefore conclude that our secondary comparative statics
also hold when evaluated in terms of our empirical measure of volatility, volF.
35Virtually all micro-level studies measuring elasticities of substitution (or cross-price elasticities) within sectors
￿nd estimates substantially below 10 (except for very rare cases of a few special commodity goods). One of the most
comprehensive such study, using data on prices across export origins by Broda and Weinstein (2006), ￿nds a median
price elasticity of 2.5 within all traded 3-digit SITC sectors (the standard error across the 327 di⁄erent sectors is 1.2).
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